

Rlep. 46-7
Stomach de loup
Aoyte telenken

Logika Aristoteliana.

1.

1. In the logic of Aristotle here (The meaning, i.e. Logika jst ucin matomst ki) will be kept to view a collection of the formulae of the science, expressed by numbers, but, (it is thought), less perfect scheme of symbols. An. Jnt. 13.
2. The canonical forms of the Aristotelian syllogism are really symbolical; only the symbols are less perfect of their kind, than those of mathematics. An. Jnt. 11.
3. Between the forms [Syllogism] about to be developed and the Aristotelian canons, some points of difference will occasionally be observed, of which it may be proper to forewarn the reader. [To the right understanding of these it is proper to remark, that the essential structure of a Syllogism is in some measure arbitrary. Supposing the order of the premises to be fixed, and the

distinction of the major and the minor term
to be thereby determined, it is purely a matter
of choice, which of the two ~~have~~ shall have
precedence in the conclusion. Logicians have
settled this question in favour of the minor
term, but it is clear, that this is a convention.
Had it been agreed, that the major term
should have the first place in the conclu-
sion, a hoped scheme might have been
constructed, less convenient in some cases
than the existing one, but superior in
others. What is lost in ~~harshness~~, it would gain
in ~~formality~~. Convenience is ~~perhaps~~
in favour of the adopted arrangement,
but it is to be remembered that it were
by an arrangement (Ann^d:- In the the-
tical use of syllogism, the ~~advent~~ ~~use~~
appears to red with the rejected form.)
[Now the method we shall exhibit, not

having reference to one scheme of arrangement more than to another, will always give the more general conclusion, regard being paid only to its abstract truthfulness, considered as a result of pure reasoning. As therefore we shall sometimes have presented to us the spectacle of conclusions, which a logician would pronounce informal, but never of such as a reasoning being would account false. The Aristotelian Canon, however, beside restricting the order of the terms of a conclusion, limits their nature also, and this limitation is of more consequence than the former. We may, by a change of figure, replace the particular conclusion of *barbara* by the general conclusion of *barbara*; but we cannot thus reduce to rule

14

such inferences as, "Some x 's are y 's".
Yet there are cases, in which such inferences
may lawfully be drawn, and in unrestricted
argument they are of frequent occurrence.
Now, if an inference of this, or of any other
kind, is lawful in itself, it will be exhibited
in the results of our method. [We shall may
by restricting the canon of interpretation con-
fine our expressed results within the limits
of the scholastic logic? but this would only
be to restrict ourselves to the use of a part
of the conclusions, to which our analysis
entitles us. Boole An. pg. 33-34.]